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With widespread outages caused by devastating natural disasters such as Superstorm Sandy and
Hurricane Ike in the nation’s recent memory, the public wants to know that the electric utility
industry is prepared to withstand and respond to the storms of the future. But is the industry
prepared? The government’s role in regulating the electric utility industry makes it impossible to
properly analyze why industry players are prepared or unprepared without looking at the actions
and decisions of the state regulatory officials. The industry’s actions are inherently tied to the
regulations it is required to follow and the costs it is allowed to recover.
State public service commissions are tasked with allowing investments and setting rates for the
electric utility industry that are “just and reasonable” and “in the public interest.” These vague
guidelines have led to many different approaches to investments, cost recovery, and rate-setting.
State commissioners are tasked with finding the balance between keeping costs low today and
ensuring service remains reliable for their ratepayers in the future. With one of the worst
economic recessions in U.S. history and predictions for tomorrow’s climate trends worsening
every year, are state commissions striking the proper balance? Part I of this Note gives a brief
introduction to the role of state commissions within the electric utility industry, with a focus on
why this matters in the context of the important discussion taking place today on climate change
trends and, more specifically, preparing for tomorrow’s storms. Part II presents a summary of
what actions, if any, Gulf Coast state commissions have taken regarding resiliency measures and
storm hardening and how some major utilities have responded to those actions, or alternatively,
how utilities have acted when little commission action has occurred. Part III provides an analysis
of the results of the survey and recommendations going forward.
I. Introduction
A. Role of State Commissions
State commissions play an important role in public utility regulation, including the regulation of
storm hardening. The rates that a public utility charges its customers are subject to government
regulation. While the federal government sets rates in the electric utility industry for interstate
transmission as well as the wholesale market, states have the authority to set a public utility’s

retail rates.1 Federal laws such as the Energy Policy Act of 2005 have recently led to a larger
federal role in the electric industry, but states still have the regulatory authority to determine
distribution retail rates and to work to ensure safe, reliable, and adequate service. While specific
approaches to rate design differ, a utility’s rate is generally determined using a “just and
reasonable” standard or a variant thereof.2 A just and reasonable rate allows a utility company to
earn a fair return on its prudent costs while also keeping costs low for ratepayers.3 However,
there is no bright-line rule on what defines a fair return or a prudent investment.4 Commissions
are given broad authority to make these decisions. In addition to rate-setting, a state
commission’s authority includes, but is not limited to, the power to set reliability standards, to
establish reporting requirements, or to implement energy conservation and efficiency programs.5
The state legislature may also exercise this authority directly, but it delegates concurrent
authority to a regulatory body, a public service commission.6
This note looks at two major areas relating to preparation for tomorrow’s storms in which state
commissions have the power to require or incentivize action by electric utilities: storm resiliency
measures and storm hardening. State commissions have the power to incentivize action in these
areas, but arguably state commissions are also in the best position to take action in these areas as
they are best able to identify and prioritize local vulnerabilities. Many predicted climate change
trends affect different regions of the United States in diverse ways.7 Thus, a national approach to
storm preparation for utilities does not make as much sense. State commissions are in the best
position to make the most informed decisions on how to act.
B. Climate Change Trends and the Gulf Coast
Numerous studies have identified several climate change trends that have significant impacts on
the U.S. energy sector, many of which are predicted to continue.8 Average annual temperatures
across the country have increased, and several areas throughout the United States experienced
record-breaking high temperatures in 2012. 9 Since 1960, heat waves are generally happening
1

This federal-state balance of regulatory power within the utility sector has changed several times in the
nation’s history, but the stated balance above is the balance in effect today. See generally FEDERAL
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, An Overview of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
Federal Regulation of Public Utilities in the U.S, available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/fercdoes/ferc101.pdf (December 2010).
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See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 37-1-80 (a) (2013) (“The rates and charges for the services rendered and required
shall be reasonable and just to both the utility and the public.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.041(1) (2013)
(“In fixing the just, reasonable, and compensatory rates . . . .”).
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more frequently and with increasing intensity.10 Droughts are also increasing in number and
duration.11 Of particular concern to many is the increasing intensity of hurricanes and tropical
storms.12 While the problem of droughts is threatening certain areas of the country, the
complementary issue of flooding and sea level rise is also a major threat to many regions.13 The
rate at which the global sea level is rising has doubled over the last twenty years as compared to
the rate over the last century.14
These trends vary region by region, but the coastal states of the South and Southeast (commonly
known as the Gulf Coast) are especially vulnerable to many of the identified climate change
trends.15 The region is expected to experience more extreme heat in the near future.16 Of
particular concern for this Note, it is also an area that is at especially high risk of hurricanes and
tropical storms.17 On average, losses from extreme storms already cost the Gulf Coast about $14
billion annually.18 The damage estimates from the worst storms to have hit the U.S. in recent
years are shocking. Estimates of the costs of damages to the U.S. from Hurricane Sandy are over
$50 billion dollars as of May 2013.19 The damages total from Hurricane Katrina has been
reported as $108 billion dollars.20 Furthermore, sea level rise is exacerbated in this region by
land subsidence (the gradual sinking of an area of land).21 The combination of more intense
storms and increasing sea level rise is expected to lead to higher storm surge damage in this
region.22
These issues are not theoretical risks of tomorrow. They have already proven to be a major
problem today, as evidenced by the billions in damages that several recent hurricanes have cost
the area.23 One report estimates that up to 3% of the nation’s future GDP could go towards
reconstruction costs exclusively in the Gulf Coast.24
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Id. at 17.
Id. at 26.
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Id. at 37-38. While the report found that the number of storms hitting land over the years has fluctuated
and some studies predict that storms will be less frequent, the studies and report still predict that the
storms will get stronger.
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Id. at 28.
14
Id. at 38.
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C. Electric Industry Vulnerabilities
These climate change trends could be especially costly to the electric utility industry. Facilities
for generation, transmission, and distribution are all at high risk of damage from more intense
storms (the highest damage costs result from high winds, flooding, and storm surges).25 Higher
wind speeds have the potential to damage distribution and transmission poles.26 Flooding and
storm surges can cause serious harm to substations.27 While storms are an especially significant
risk, problems associated with rising temperatures are also of concern. Hotter temperatures lower
the ability of electric utilities to meet demand because transmission and distribution systems
carry less current as the temperature rises, which increases the risk of power outages.28
The vulnerability of this industry is especially worrisome considering our nation’s dependency
on electricity. Storm-related power outages cost the nation billions of dollars annually.29
Furthermore, vulnerabilities are not limited to just one region. The interconnectivity of the
nation’s electrical grid means that damage to facilities can have wide-ranging impacts that go far
beyond that locality.30 The vulnerability of the electric industry to damages is multiplied because
of the risk that the industry is not prepared to respond to damages quickly. Understandably,
power outages that last longer cause more damage. Thus, it is crucial that electric utilities have
the ability to restore power quickly after damage has occurred.
It is clear that these climate change trends raise the risk of damage because of their potential
effect on the industry’s supply side; the fuse is lit from both ends, however, because of the
additional potential effect these trends can have on the industry’s demand side. For many
different reasons, the demand for electricity in the U.S. is growing.31 Because electricity cannot
ordinarily be stored in a cost-efficient manner at this point,32 the amount of electricity the
industry has the ability to produce (capacity) must be able to meet the highest level of expected
demand (peak demand).33 As peak demand grows, so must the utility’s ability to meet that
demand – whether through increased capacity or demand side management.34 Issues such as
25

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 19, 21. (“Rising temperatures are expected to increase transmission losses, reduce current
carrying capacity, increase stresses on the distribution system, and decrease substation efficiency and
lifespan.” (citations omitted))
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RICHARD CAMPBELL, WEATHER-RELATED POWER OUTAGES AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RESILIENCY, 75700 R42696 (2012).
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DEPT OF ENERGY, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather 13–14
(2013).
31
Id.
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While there are certain electricity storage technologies that are possible, such as pumped hydroelectric
storage facilities, these technologies are limited in the amount that can be stored and used within the U.S.
electric grid. See Stan Kaplan, Cong. Research Serv., R40797, Electric Power Storage 1 (2009).
33
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL (West ed., 2nd ed. 2004).
34
The importance of demand side management, such as demand response programs, cannot be overstated.
However, while I felt it was important to mention the demand side issues public utilities face to
emphasize the importance of the electric industry preparing for the future, the topic of demand side
management is not the focus of this Note.
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higher temperatures and longer heat waves exacerbate the problem because they cause a
significant increase in demand for cooling and, consequently, higher peak requirements.35 Thus,
increased temperatures cause an increase in demand just when the system is less capable of
supplying electricity.36 This raises the risk that current electric facilities will become overloaded,
causing blackouts.37
As discussed in the previous section, the South and Southeast coastal region is at especially high
risk to these climate change trends. This region is also densely developed with electric utility
facilities.38 Consequently, the region is of particular concern to our nation’s economy.
D. Storm Response and Mitigation Measures
The damage that these climate change trends can cause has roused the public’s attention after
several recent natural disasters have cost the nation billions of dollars in damages.39 While the
exact nature and scope of the future impact of these climate trends on the U.S. electric utility
industry cannot be determined with exactness, many studies are recognizing the importance of
taking action today in order to prepare for the likely scenario that these trends will continue.40
Many long-term mitigation solutions to mitigate climate change trends, such as GHG emission
standards and the development of the renewable energy industry, have been proposed (and
vigorously contested). While long-term solutions are important, this Note focuses on the several
adaptation actions that, if taken now, have the potential to produce significant benefits in the
short-term as well as the long-term. These actions (normally referred to as storm response,
adaptation, and/or mitigation measures) are considered the best solutions to “combating and
mitigating storm damage and outages.”41 A short outline of these two major potential areas of
action is provided below:
1. Resiliency measures refer to measures taken to enhance the reliability of operations by
improving the facility’s ability “to recover quickly from damage to any of its components or to
any of the external systems on which it depends.”42 The primary purpose of resiliency measures
is not to prevent damage from occurring in the first place. The primary purpose is to ensure quick
recovery in the case that damage does in fact occur.43 Examples of resiliency measures include
the creation of a company-specific emergency plan for employees, contracting for meeting the
35

DEPT OF ENERGY, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather 22
(2013).
36
Id.
37
See, e.g. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Arizona-Southern California Outages on
September 8, 2011 Causes and Recommendations. http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/04-27-2012ferc-nerc-report.pdf. (2012); PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, Adaptation of California’s
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ENTERGY CORP. AND WETLANDS FOUNDATION, Building a Resilient Energy Gulf Coast (2011).
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(2013).
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EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Before and After the Storm 7 (2013).
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DEP’T OF ENERGY, Hardening and Resiliency: U.S. Energy Industry Response to Recent Hurricane
Seasons v (2010).
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Id.
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increased labor demand that storm response requires, and ensuring standby equipment is
available.44 A less common, but highly recommended, resiliency measure is participation in
regional mutual assistance groups in which several utilities across regions agree to assist others
in times of need.45 Certain Smart Grid technologies are also considered resiliency measures
because they can assist electric utilities in preventing outages through highly responsive grid
isolation actions or they can increase a company’s ability to quickly respond to outages as well.46
2. Storm hardening refers to “physically changing the infrastructure to make it less susceptible to
damage from extreme wind, flooding, or flying debris.”47 In contrast to resiliency measures, the
primary purpose of storm hardening is to improve the infrastructure’s ability to withstand storms
in order to lower the risk of damage occurring at all.48 Examples of storm hardening include
upgrading distribution and transmission poles, elevating substations that are at risk of flooding,
and “undergrounding” power lines and other facilities that are at too high of a risk of damage
above ground.49 One important storm hardening measure can also be considered a resiliency
measure: the identification and prioritization of a company’s or industry’s vulnerabilities through
localized assessments.50 This information allows electric utilities to properly invest their limited
funds in both resiliency measures and storm hardening based on where the need is highest.
Without localized vulnerability assessments, electric utilities run the risk of taking action that
may not be the most cost-effective for that region at that time.
E. Possible Barriers
Several studies have found that certain actions, if taken today, could save a significant amount of
money for the electric utility industry and its ratepayers in the future.51 Unfortunately, a number
of barriers may be working to prevent the implementation of these actions.52 A summary of some
of the major barriers identified as acting against the most efficient, cost-effective use of storm
hardening and resiliency measures is provided below.
One major issue is that regulatory commissions and utilities may not have enough information,
or access to information, to accurately identify the best, most cost-effective use of such
measures. In the context of limited time and resources, identifying the most important measures
to implement is essential for the success of such measures. Unfortunately, identification of costeffective storm hardening and resiliency measures is a highly localized task. Because climate
44

See THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 15-16 (Michael Gerrard ed., 2011).
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS AND THE U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY’S OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY
DELIVERY AND ENERGY RELIABILITY, Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to
Weather Outages 12 (2010).
46
See THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 15-16 (Michael Gerrard ed., 2012)
47
DEPT OF ENERGY, Hardening and Resiliency: U.S. Energy Industry Response to Recent Hurricane
Seasons (2010).
48
Id.
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See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Before and After the Storm 1–14 (2013).
50
DEPT OF ENERGY, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather 36
(2013); see also EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, Before and After the Storm 12 (2013).
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ENTERGY CORP. AND WETLANDS FOUNDATION, Building a Resilient Energy Gulf Coast (2011).
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change trends are having different effects on different regions, the prioritization of hardening and
resiliency measures will vary significantly region to region. Formulating a cost-effective action
plan requires a large amount of data and analysis, most of which is difficult, time-consuming,
and costly for one commission or utility company to gather on its own.53 Furthermore, even
when the localized climate data is available to a commission or utility, it may be difficult to
translate that data into concrete regulatory or business decisions. The difficult primarily arises
because these decisions involve analyzing the economic impact of climate trends as well. For
example, a utility may know that a certain region is predicted to experience significantly
increased wind speeds during storms in the near future. However, this does not easily resolve the
business decision of, for example, whether it is more cost-effective for the utility to prioritize an
investment in upgrading its distribution poles as compared to an investment in additional storm
response planning. The probabilistic nature of climate change trends also makes it difficult to
incorporate the information into all of the other information commissions or electric utilities look
at when making financial decisions.54 Climate change trends and hardening and resiliency
measures involve the use of a less certain cost-benefit analysis (due to the fact that climate
change models involve a statistical range of possible future weather scenarios and not an exact
prediction) over a longer range of time than these electric utilities typically use in a decisionmaking process.55 Climate change is also a politicized topic and an area in which conflicting
information has been, and continues to be, presented to the public.56 Uncertainty regarding the
reliability of data in the face of this conflicting information may result in inaction.
Another possible barrier to the most cost-effective implementation of resiliency and hardening
measures is an ineffective commission approach to cost-recovery mechanisms for such measures.
Cost-recovery mechanisms are methods by which the utility recovers its costs from consumers.
This can occur through its rate base, rate adjustment mechanisms, or even securitization and
insurance reserve funds. The choice of which mechanisms to put in place for which costs can
have very important effects on utility actions. First, the method by which the utility company
recovers costs can have an important impact on the public’s response. If the costs of a large
investment are transferred over to the customer all at once, customer’s surprise against a sudden,
dramatic rate increase, commonly referred to as “rate shock,” may lead to strong public
resistance. Distributing cost-recovery over a longer period of time can help to alleviate the effect
of certain costs on the ratepayers while also still ensuring that utilities recover for prudent
investments. For example, some state commissions include storm resiliency or hardening efforts
in a utility’s rate base. If a utility wants to make investments now, it may not be able to recover
those costs for years depending on when its next rate case is scheduled. In addition, utilities may
not want to invest money now if it is not clear whether the commission will allow recovery for
those costs as reasonable at the next rate case. Other state commissions allow electric utilities to
recover storm damage or storm hardening costs through a separate rider or tariff that is attached
to a customer’s bill through a surcharge in addition to the base rate.57 That surcharge can be
adjusted during the period in between rate hearings, which often only happen once every several
53

See CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, Weathering the Storm (2013).
DEPT OF ENERGY, U.S. Energy Sector Vulnerabilities to Climate Change and Extreme Weather 15
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years. Such rate adjustment mechanisms are often used for costs that utilities did not foresee at
the time of the previous rate case, costs that are volatile and thus difficult to predict (such as fuel
costs), or costs that are a result of a non-recurring event.58 Thus, the use of separate riders or
tariffs is significant because it allows utilities to recover their costs more quickly and also allows
them to, in certain circumstances, receive commission approval of the investment before moving
forward. How a commission does or, more importantly, does not allow cost recovery for certain
costs may have a significant effect on utility action. The financial decisions of utilities are
inherently tied to their outlook on the ability to recover those costs relatively painlessly. Thus, a
commission’s power to allow or bar recovery of certain costs and its power to determine how
that cost recovery happens is very important. Inefficient use of cost-recovery mechanisms may
serve to discourage utilities from making investments even if it is actually cost-effective to do so.
Other common cost-recovery issues that may affect a utility’s incentives to invest in resiliency
and hardening include whether a commission uses historical costs or predicted future costs to
determine recovery, whether a commission allows a utility to recover interest on certain
investments, and whether a commission allows the use of certain self-insurance and
securitization techniques such as storm reserve accounts or storm bonds.59
The overemphasis of short-term costs and benefits as compared to long-term costs and benefits
may be serving as another barrier to efficient and cost-effective action. As discussed in the
previous section, public service commissions are tasked with the responsibility of setting rates
that are just and reasonable.60 But what does “just and reasonable” mean? This responsibility
entails fixing electric rates to strike the right balance between the consumer's interest in keeping
costs low and the public's interest in continued reliability of the industry through investments in
areas like those described above: resiliency measures and storm hardening.61 How much
investment today is just and reasonable if it prevents higher costs in the future? As to be
expected, there are many different possible answers to this question. As it is impossible to
predict how exactly these climate change trends will affect the industry, some see investments
related to such trends as too speculative to justify the accompanying increase in rates.62 Many
recognize the benefit of such actions but don’t agree that the benefits outweigh the costs at this
time.63 The public interest in keeping rates low is especially great in times of recession.64
Commissioners feel the pressure to avoid “rate shock,” especially those whose job depends on
future election by those consumers. Commissioners may have a disincentive to act because the
potential for an increase in rates almost always draws public attention while inaction or refusal to
allow utilities to take action, even if ultimately it would be cost-effective to do so, most likely
58

Id. at 17.
Id. at 15-20.
60
ALA. CODE § 37-1-80 (“shall be reasonable and just to both the utility and the public”).
61
See 29 CJS Electricity 64.
62
See supra note 49; CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, Weathering the Storm (2013) PG
77 Id. at 75. (“There are still questions—both within the company and among U.S. state regulators—
about whether recent extreme weather is attributable to climate change and indicative of a ‘new normal.’
Given this uncertainty and the lack of any federal mandate, should the company spend more to harden
power and gas systems? If National Grid does invest in system upgrades, and the unusual weather
subsides, will they be punished by state regulators and shareholders?”)
63
See FL PSC Order No. 09-855.
64
Id. (“The downturn of the present economy, coupled with soaring unemployment, make rates and the
monthly utility bill ever more important to utility customers.” ).
59
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has limited or no impact on public opinion because it is less likely that the public is aware of the
alternatives to inaction. The politicization of climate change issues in today’s world also may
have undue influence on the decisions and actions of state governments and regulatory bodies.65
For example, commissioners may feel they must take a certain stance on climate-related issues
because of their party affiliation. Commissioners may also worry that their decisions in this area
may affect their ability to get re-elected.
Any or all of these barriers may be working against the implementation of cost-effective and
important storm resiliency measures and storm hardening. Thus, action may not occur even when
there has been widespread agreement within the scientific community that properly preparing the
electric industry for tomorrow’s storms is crucial and cost-effective in the long-term.
F. Storm Resiliency Measures and Storm Hardening in the Gulf States: An Introduction to
the Survey
With the very real risk of these future climate trends and the abundance of studies recommending
certain actions, is action happening? This Note summarizes what state regulatory commissions of
the Southeast region are doing today to prepare for tomorrow’s storms by looking at commission
action taken in the two major areas of storm resiliency measures and storm hardening. This
Survey then looks at how the actions of state regulatory commissions may be affecting the
decisions and actions of electric utilities through a comparative analysis of how utilities have
responded to commission actions in the different states surveyed. Finally, this Note attempts to
synthesize all of this information to determine what commission actions are working and what
remains to be done.
This Survey focuses on the states of the Gulf Coast region because the area is particularly
vulnerable to the problems of tomorrow’s storms. The predicted severity of tomorrow’s storms in
the Gulf Coast region is especially troublesome, considering that the electric utility industry has
such a large presence in this region.66 Furthermore, there are more local studies on climate
change trends in this region (most likely because of the extensive damages this region and the
electric utility industry of this region have suffered because of several recent huge storms as well
as the predicted storms of tomorrow). These studies provide important data on the potential costeffectiveness of certain storm resiliency measures and storm hardening.

65

See generally Aaron M. McWright and Riley E. Dunlap, The Politicization of Climate Change and
Polarization in the American Public’s View of Global Warming, 2001-2010, The Sociological Quarterly
52, 155-194 (2011); see also Michelle S. Simon and William Pentland, Reliable Science: Overcoming
Public Doubts in the Climate Change Debate, 37 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 219 (Fall 2012);
Robert F. Rich and Kelly R. Merrick, Use and Misuse of Science: Global Climate Change and the Bush
Administration, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 223 (Spring 2007).
66
See ENTERGY CORP. AND WETLANDS FOUNDATION, Building a Resilient Energy Gulf Coast (2011).
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II. Storm Resiliency and Storm Hardening in the Gulf State Region: A Survey
A. Summary of Survey Method
The specific states within the Gulf Region that this Note focuses on are Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. This Survey summarizes actions taken, if any, by state
commissions that involve storm resiliency measures and storm hardening. The Survey further
provides information on how utilities have responded to any commission action. The summaries
consist of information gathered through researching state laws, commission regulations, orders,
and reports. Utility response is based on information provided in public documents filed with the
regulatory commission, as well as utility statements and reports. Some studies also contained
summaries of utility response. Actions taken and utility responses are further divided into two
major sub-areas: (1) commission action related to reporting and (2) substantive action
requirements and the specific cost-recovery mechanisms in place regarding storm resiliency
measures and storm hardening. While there are several different cost-recovery mechanisms that
can be implemented, this study limits the analysis to three major mechanisms: Rate adjustment
mechanisms, use of storm reserve accounts, and securitization. This limit does not reflect any
opinion on the quality or effectiveness of certain mechanisms as compared to others.
B. Commission Action: Resiliency Measures and Storm Hardening

Regulatory Requirements

Alabama



Florida




The electric utility
company has its
emergency plan on
file with the
commission.67 (but it
is does not seem to
be available
publicly).
Distribution Service
Reliability Report69
Storm Hardening
Plan, which includes
storm preparation
actions70

How often is utility action
required?

Is there a review
and/or approval
process involved?



It only needs to be
updated if the
company changes its
emergency plan.68



There is no
formal review
or approval
process.



The Reliability Report
must be submitted
annually.71





The Storm Hardening
Plan must be updated
every three years.72

All reports
require
approval by
the
commission.73

67

See ALABAMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, State of Alabama Emergency Operations Plan
ESF 12 – 4 (Feb. 1, 2012).
68
Id.
69
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-6.0455.
70
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-6.0342.
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Louisiana

Mississippi



Emergency response
plan74





Integrated Resource
Plan (IRP) Order
issued in 201275







Emergency Response
Plan must be
submitted annually.76
After the initial IRP is
filed, it must be
updated every 4
years.77





The
commission
reviews the
Emergency
Response
Plans.78
The
commission
has stated it
will review
and approve
IRPs but this
is ongoing.79

No regulations
related to storm
preparation or storm
hardening.
Past MS PSC Orders
reference post-storm
inquiries into actions
taken by utilities to
prepare for major
storms and its
response to major
storms.80

71

See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-6.0455 and 25-6.0221(5).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 25-6.0342.
73
See supra notes 72-74.
74
See LA PSC General Order, 1992 WL 609478.
75
See LA PSC Corrected General Order, Docket No. R-30021.
76
Supra 76.
77
See La.P.S.C. Corrected General Order at16, Docket No. R-30021.
78
Supra 76.
79
Supra 79.
80
See, e.g. MS PSC Order (Dec. 13, 2002), Docket No. 02-UN-0526 (“In response to the Commission's
inquiry and at the Commission's direction, the Company implemented a number of reliability and
customer service improvement programs [in 1998]. In order to allow the Commission to monitor the
effectiveness of these programs, the Company keeps the Commission informed on a monthly basis of
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Emergency
Operations Plan82



Storm Preparation
and related Storm
Hardening Report83








Vegetation
Management Plan84

Emergency Operations
plan must be reviewed
annually by the utility
for accuracy, but it
only needs to be refiled if updated.85
Storm hardening plan
must be updated every
5 years86
Service Quality, Storm
Preparation, and
Vegetation
Management reports
are required to be
submitted annually.87





No
requirements
imposed
beyond
general
reporting
requirements.
The
commission is
authorized to
penalize
utilities for
violating
service
quality and/or
service
reliability
standards.

While the majority of states surveyed have imposed some standards or requirements regarding
storm resiliency measures, the substance of those requirements, the accessibility of the reports or
information, and the method through which these requirements are imposed vary widely. This
Section discusses the different approaches each state has taken to resiliency and hardening. The
only two states of this Survey that have regulations addressing reporting requirements
specifically related to storm hardening are Florida and Texas, so we will begin by looking at
those two states.88
Florida and Texas
The Florida Public Service commission has adopted several regulations related to hardening and
resiliency. Florida’s regulatory actions in this area go beyond the other states surveyed in the
extent of detail required. For example, utilities must provide supporting performance data in its
report on how its facilities are performing (with the goal of identifying highly vulnerable
equipment).89 The commission seems to view resiliency measures as a sub-category of
hardening. Its regulation requiring utilities to submit storm hardening plans includes, as one of its
primary goals, the reduction of “restoration costs and outage times associated with extreme
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weather events,” which traditionally falls into the resiliency category.90 As part of this storm
hardening plan, electric utilities must submit a reliability assessment of its facilities, including
analysis of its performance during storms as supported by data collection.91 They must also
submit a Disaster Preparedness Plan as part of the storm hardening reports.92 The commission
further emphasized resiliency measures through its statement that the utilities’ plans should
include information on “lessons learned [from previous storm recovery performance], disaster
recovery training, pre-storm staging activities, and post-storm recovery.”93
The Florida commission’s regulation and related order on the Storm Hardening Report is also the
only state commission among the Gulf State commissions surveyed that requires substantive
action related to storm hardening from utilities beyond reporting. The reporting requirements
mandate utilities to report on activities that the very same regulation orders them to implement.
The Storm Hardening Reporting requirements include ten initiatives. The utilities are required to
submit detailed report on each initiative, including the scope, timeline, and estimated costs of
plans and actions in each initiative. The Florida commission developed these ten initiatives using
the results from localized vulnerability assessments completed after the 2005 and 2006 hurricane
seasons. The commission used those assessments to develop regulatory requirements that
prioritize the most important and cost-effective resiliency and hardening actions for its region.
For example, all electric utilities in every state implement some sort of vegetation management
plan; many are based upon national standards. However, the Florida commission has adopted
specific vegetation management requirements based on localized cost-benefit assessments. While
all of the initiatives are worthy storm hardening measures in their most general format, the
amount of detail included in the regulation and related Commission Order reflects a very
informed, localized approach to storm hardening and resiliency.
The ten initiatives include a three-year trim cycle plan for their distribution facilities (including
performance requirements), an audit of Joint-Use Attachment Agreements (in which utilities
conduct strength tests on poles with attachments), a six-year Transmission Structure Inspection
Program, the development of a plan to upgrade or replace their existing transmission (including
any limiting factors), a plan to develop a geographic information system for their transmission
and distribution facilities, the development of a program to collect post-storm data for forensic
analysis, the development of a program to collect performance data that differentiates between
overhead and underground facility performance, the development of a program to increase
coordination with local governments, a plan to increase collaborative research and promote cost
sharing, and a natural disaster preparedness and recovery plan, outlining their recovery
procedures. 94 The Florida commission also implements a review and approval process for these
reports, which it takes seriously. The commission has shown, through its previous review and
approval sessions, that it would not approve whatever information utilities submitted. The
commission went through an extensive review and approval process after the initial reports were
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filed in 2007, in which the commission rejected some electric utilities’ initial reports and
required those utilities to revise and re-file their plans again.95
The Florida commission also emphasizes collaboration and communication both between the
government and the utilities as well as between the utilities themselves. In 2007, the commission
required all investor owned utilities within its jurisdiction to assist in funding and participating in
a collaborative storm hardening research program with Florida universities and research
organizations.96 In response, the utilities formed a non-profit, member-financed organization to
collaborate research efforts, with a particular focus on hurricane wind effects, vegetation
management, and undergrounding.97 The utilities are also easily able to communicate and learn
from each other through the commission’s use of annual workshops that bring all utilities
together to report on their progress with, for example, hurricane preparedness.98 The Florida
commission summarizes much of this collaboration, along with other actions taken in this area,
on the “Storm Hardening” section of its website.99
It is important to note that much of the Florida commission’s initiative in resiliency and
hardening was originally due to actions taken by the Florida State Legislature. For example, in
2006, the Florida legislature passed a law requiring the Florida Public Service Commission to
conduct a study looking at what should be done to enhance reliability of transmission and
distribution grids.100 This included a sub-requirement that the commission provide an annual
report to the Legislature on its actions related to this matter. These actions by the state legislature
were the original reason why the Florida Commission implemented all the initiatives discussed
above.
Texas has also implemented several regulations related to resiliency and hardening in recent
years. In December 2008, the Texas Commission funded an extensive localized vulnerability
assessment by Quanta that was completed in 2011.101 The study recommended several “first
stage” and “second stage” best practices actions that Texas utilities should take.102 In 2009, the
Texas Legislature passed a bill requiring all electric transmission and distribution utilities to
report to the Texas Commission describing any activities the utilities undertook related to the
identification of areas vulnerable to storm damage, any hardening efforts within those areas,
vegetation management activities, and distribution pole inspections.103 In response to the Quanta
study and the legislation, the Texas PUC adopted several new reporting requirements, with a
95
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particular focus on resiliency measures such as emergency response planning.104 Utilities must
provide specific information regarding their critical load assessments, their prioritization lists for
returning service during an emergency, and their emergency communications plans. All electric
utilities must also conduct an annual drill to test and evaluate their emergency response plans,
and an affidavit must be submitted ensuring the commission that all personnel are familiar with
emergency procedures.
The Texas Commission also adopted a regulation in 2009 that requires all utilities to submit an
annual report identifying any activities they have undertaken related to emergency operations
planning and to identify the most vulnerable service areas and facilities.105 This report must also
include information on any activities utilities undertook related to vegetation management and
distribution pole inspections to prevent damage in severe weather.106 The specific details the
commission required from utilities in these reports were primarily based upon the localized
vulnerabilities identified in the Quanta Study. In 2010, the Texas Commission adopted additional
reporting requirements related to electric utilities’ storm hardening activities. The commission
required additional information to be included in the five-year plans that utilities submitted to the
regulatory body. The utilities had to provide details of any plans they had to harden their
infrastructure for storms through construction standards, their hazard tree identification and
mitigation plans, and their smart grid improvement plans related to storm recovery and fast
outage response.107 However, the commission emphasized repeatedly that while it was requiring
reporting on these areas, it was not establishing any requirements to take specific actions.108
Texas also considered and rejected requiring utilities to report on the projected costs for the
projects or setting performance goals for any of the initiatives.109
Even though the commission does not require action from utilities beyond reporting, the Texas
Legislature has given the commission statutory authority to penalize utilities for certain
violations such as failing to file reports on time or failing to follow general service reliability
standards.110 The commission does exercise this power, as evidenced through its list of penalties
that was included in its 2013 Annual Report to the Texas Legislature.111
Similar to the approach taken by the Florida Commission, the Texas Commission has attempted
to provide the public, the electric utilities, and all other major stakeholders with a comprehensive
source of information on the topics of resiliency and hardening. The Texas Utility Commission,
along with two other Texas regulatory commissions, recently prepared an extensive “Energy
Assurance Plan” that was published in November 2012. This report summarized the general
strategy utilized by the commission along with major actions taken to address the preparation
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and response to the general threat of natural disasters, including storm resiliency and hardening
actions.112 The Texas Commission has also funded several electric projects that are related to
hardening and resiliency, a summary of which is provided on its website.113
Many actions taken by the Texas Commission were also, as in Florida, initiated by the Texas
State Legislature. As a result of the Legislature’s interest in these areas, the Texas Utility
Commission’s Annual Reports to the Legislature are very useful sources of information for
action taken related to resiliency and hardening.
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi
In contrast to Florida and Texas, the commissions of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi have
not adopted any significant regulations related to hardening or resiliency. There are no major
regulations on these topics in these three states, but the Louisiana Commission did pass some
resiliency requirements through Commission Orders. In 1992, the commission issued an Order
requiring electric utilities to submit emergency response plans annually.114 The Order requires
that utilities report on “their plans for continuation and restoration of service in the event of
generation failure and restoration of service where inclement weather or natural disaster has
caused disruption. These plans shall include specific and detailed information as to how the plan
shall be carried out.”115 While the Order requires that plans are revised, as needed, annually and
are reviewed by the commission, an extensive search did not reveal any public hearings or
Orders by the commission following up on this original Order.116 Thus, it is difficult to
determine what action is actually being taken within the commission to review these plans, if
any.
In 2008, in response to Hurricane Gustav, the Louisiana Commission opened a rulemaking
docket to discuss the costs and benefits of “potential methods to decrease the vulnerability of
electric utility distribution infrastructure in response to severe weather events.”117 The docket
discussion was focused primarily on the costs and benefits of undergrounding distribution
facilities and hardening the infrastructure through distribution pole replacement.118 The
assessment seems to have been primarily based on utility feedback to certain questions related to
those two areas.119 The commission Staff ultimately advised the commission against passing any
112
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state-wide mandates, stating that any mandates would not be cost-effective. The Staff advised
that it was best to allow utilities the flexibility to develop their own plans.120
In 2012, the Louisiana Commission adopted a regulation requiring utilities to file Integrated
Resource Plans detailing their five-year resource planning efforts.121 This regulation includes a
requirement that utilities provide information on projects and planning related to reliability of
their infrastructures generally. Reliability projects would theoretically include resiliency or
hardening plans but this is not specifically required.
As discussed above, the Louisiana Commission’s public records indicate that the commission
has not taken any significant regulatory action related to hardening or resiliency, yet the
commission’s Five-Year Strategic Plans from both 2010 and 2013 (filed as required by the state),
include several descriptions of various emergency response planning activities that serve to
advance the Louisiana State Outcome Goal of Hurricane Protection and Emergency
Preparedness.122 The commission states that its oversight “involves the filing of electric utilities
of annual Emergency Service Plans with the PSC; performance under the State Plan; response
coordination and resource allocation following disasters; and docketed audits of utility planning
and performance following a disaster.”123 It also states that its Office of General Counsel
“conducts investigations, hearings, and rulemakings” to determine whether utilities are prepared
for storm response “consistent with best practices of the industry.”124 However, there are no
easily accessible public records to verify these statements. There seems to be a discrepancy
between these commission statements and its public records.
One interesting aspect about Louisiana’s regulatory system is its divided approach to the
supervision of its electric utilities. It is the New Orleans City Council, not the Louisiana Public
Service Commission, which has general regulatory authority over electric utilities providing
services within its jurisdiction.125 Thus, the City of New Orleans normally has the power to
regulate the rates and services provided within city limits by two electric utilities: Entergy New
Orleans, Inc. and the portion of Entergy Louisiana, L.L.C. that is located in Orleans Parish.126
The City Council has handled storm hardening and resiliency differently than the commission.
For example, the City Council has conducted storm investigations on numerous occasions,
reviewing Entergy’s storm preparation and response. In February of 2013, Entergy filed an
extensive report, for review by the Council, summarizing its resiliency and hardening actions
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taken after Hurricane Isaac as required by recently-adopted City Council’s Resolutions.127 This
survey does not include a full summary of New Orleans regulations related to resiliency and
hardening but references some actions taken by the City Council as a useful comparison to
actions taken (or not taken) by the Louisiana Public Service commission.
As with Louisiana, Alabama also has no major regulations related to hardening and resiliency.
The Alabama Commission only regulates one investor-owned utility: Alabama Power. Certain
government documents refer to an emergency plan that the commission apparently requires the
utility to have on file: the State of Alabama’s Emergency Operations Manual notes that Alabama
Power’s emergency plan is on file with the commission. However, there is no reference to this
plan on the Alabama Commission’s website or in any Commission Order within its archives. In
addition, a search of AL PSC’s Orders resulted in zero findings for any AL PSC Order using the
terms “storm hardening” or “storm response.”128
The Alabama Commission (along with Mississippi) requires some resiliency action from its
electric utility as a result of its automatic adoption of the national standards set by National
Electric Safety Code (NESC), which includes some requirements related to vegetation
management.129 The Alabama Commission also requires that Alabama Power keep records
related to service interruptions, including analysis of causes to determine prevention. However,
Alabama’s requirements on this matter are the same as federal standards set by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).130
It is important to note that Alabama has not had a public rate case in over 30 years. The Alabama
Commission allows Alabama Power to adjust its charges each year without any public
evidentiary hearing.131 While Louisiana and Mississippi use a similar rate-setting mechanism,
Alabama is especially worrisome because it does not offer the public any meaningful way to
participate in rate cases.132 This may be part of the reason why extensive research on hardening
and resiliency in Alabama did not result in much success.
Research on the last state of the Survey, Mississippi, also did not reveal any significant
requirements in place regarding storm resiliency or hardening measures. Its most significant
period of action related to hardening and resiliency, at least action which is supported by public
records, occurred after the 2006 hurricane season. The Mississippi Commission spent a
significant amount of time reviewing the adequacy of the utilities’ responses to the 2005
hurricanes, their storm recoveries, and related costs. However, this process did not evolve into a
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permanent regulatory fixture. Currently, there are some procedures through which the
commission reviews utility action in these areas, but they are only related to cost-recovery, as
discussed in the next section. Several commission documents reference some type of continuing
review process for analyzing electric utilities’ emergency response plans or reliability actions,
and some documents filed with the commission even offer details on those plans.133 However,
these plans do not seem to be reviewed in a public setting, nor are they easily accessible through
the commission’s public records. As with Alabama and Louisiana, whatever review process the
commission may currently conduct seems to be done primarily behind closed doors, making it
difficult to determine how thorough it approaches utility action related to resiliency and
hardening.
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B. Cost-Recovery Mechanisms Used by State Commissions
All of the commissions have required or allowed some use of cost-recovery mechanisms related
to post-storm recovery costs. For example, all state commissions included in this Survey utilize
storm reserve accounts in some manner. Some commissions also allow (but do not require)
utilities to use their storm reserve funds to invest in reliability-related projects. Some
commissions, however, have gotten more creative with their use of such mechanisms. Florida,
for example, has implemented certain cost-recovery mechanisms to ease the financial barrier for
customers concerning undergrounding new facilities.
This section explores the various uses of cost-recovery mechanisms by commissions in the five
states surveyed.
States
Alabama

Cost-Recovery Mechanisms
 Storm Reserve Account, with costrecovery allowed through rider.134


Florida







Louisiana

134

Storm hardening-related costs are
approved through hardening report
process. Costs are recovered through a
related tariff filing.135
In 2005, FL Legislature passed FL.
Stat. Ann. §366.8260 on storm
recovery financing. Storm recovery
charge, storm reserve account and issue
to finance with storm-recovery
bonds.136
FL PSC amended §25-6.0143 to allow
utilities to establish storm reserve
accounts, and allow utilities to petition
to recover costs through “a surcharge,
securitization, or other cost-recovery
mechanism.”137
2007: Legislature passed the Louisiana
Utilities Restoration Corporation Act,
creating nonprofit to issue bonds for
storm restoration costs. LUPC issued
financing orders authorizing the LURC
to borrow the proceeds of system
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Mississippi




Texas



restoration bonds. LURC also required
utilities to file an annual report with
LUPC.138
Storm Reserve accounts.139
State legislature passed 2006
Hurricane Katrina Electric Utility
Customer Relief and Electric Utility
System Restoration Act authorized
commission to approve issuance of
securitized storm bonds.140
Storm Reserve Accounts.141
2009: S.B. 769 provides for
securitization methods for storm
recovery costs.142
2011: Implemented the use of a rate
adjustment mechanism for reliabilityrelated costs through TX PUC
§25.243.143

Florida and Texas
This section again begins with a summary of actions taken by Florida and Texas. In Florida, the
commission has adopted a general regulation regarding storm-recovery costs. This regulation is
much more detailed than those of other states. The regulation includes examples of what specific
types of costs electric utilities can be expected to recover from the storm reserve account and
what costs are not acceptable to charge to the account.144 Florida has also separated its cost
review and cost-recovery mechanisms related to storm hardening and storm recovery. Storm
hardening costs are reviewed separately from other costs, as part of the storm hardening report
review, and those approved costs are recovered through a tariff. In contrast, costs related to storm
recovery are recovered through funds in the utility’s storm reserve account.145
The Florida Commission has also taken an interesting approach to cost-recovery related to
undergrounding. Prior to 2006, customers who requested underground facilities were responsible
for the cost difference comparable to the cost of an overhead facility, implemented through a
Contribution-in-Aid-of-Construction (CIAC) tariff.146 This approach is similar to the other Gulf
138
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States surveyed. This was a significant deterrence for customers due to the high up-front costs. In
2006, the commission reduced this barrier for customers significantly. The commission
implemented new requirements, which mandated that utilities do a more extensive comparable
cost analysis in determining the CIAC, which also needed to include long-term operating costs
and benefits (reducing the difference due to undergrounding’s long-term benefits). Additionally,
the commission allowed for the costs to be allocated among a more widespread basis of
customers if there proved to be quantifiable benefits for more than just the immediate customers.
The commission endorses spreading the costs over time instead of requiring the investment from
customers upfront.147
Texas has also taken advantage of several cost-recovery mechanisms in this area. As with all of
the states surveyed, the Texas Utility Commission’s use of cost-recovery mechanisms originated
through state legislation. In 2009, the Texas legislature amended the Utilities Code, adding Tex.
Util. Code Ann. §36.401, which allowed for a more timely recovery of system restoration costs
and the use of securitization financing to recover these costs.
Like Florida, the Texas Commission has also largely separated the review process for cost
recovery associated with storm hardening. In 2011, the Texas Commission adopted §25.243,
which approved the use of a Distribution and Transmission Cost Recovery Factor (DCRF).148
The DCRF provided utilities with a more efficient and timely recovery for certain investments as
utilities were allowed to make up to four requests in between rate cases to recover costs
regarding prudent storm restoration and hardening investments.149 The commission again
adopted this rule in response to Texas legislation.150
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi
All of the state commissions of this Survey require or allow the use of storm reserve accounts.
While the Texas Commission, interestingly, has not adopted a specific regulation requiring storm
reserve accounts, the commission has authorized storm reserve accounts for all electric utilities
when the utilities requested such accounts in various rate cases.
Unlike Florida and Texas, the other three states in this Survey do not separate the review process
for costs related to storm hardening or resiliency from costs related to storm recovery. The
Mississippi Commission allows electric utilities to use their storm reserve funds for both storm
restoration costs as well as storm preparation.151 Additionally, in response to the devastation
caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi state legislature passed the 2006 Hurricane Katrina
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Electric Utility Customer Relief and Electric Utility System Restoration Act.152 The purpose of
this Act was to enable the commission to authorize financing orders in which the state would
issue storm bonds to a utility. These bonds would be used to securitize a utility’s system
restoration costs and storm damage reserve levels.153 The Act specified that such costs would be
recovered through a system restoration charge in addition to customers’ base rate.154 The Act
also required that utilities submit detailed and timely reports to the commission, outlining what
system restoration activities occurred. The system restoration charge must also be reviewed at
least annually by the commission in order to adjust it accordingly.155
Alabama is the only state included in the Survey that does not utilize securitization as a tool for
cost recovery. However, the Alabama Public Utility Commission does make use of other costrecovery mechanisms for storm-related costs. The commission allows Alabama Power to use
funds from its Natural Disaster Reserve on reliability-related expenditures if the balance of the
Reserve exceeds $75 million.156 In 2010, the commission further authorized Alabama Power to
“make discretionary accruals to the Reserve above the existing authorized limit and to include
reliability related expenditures among the category of costs that can be charged against the
Reserve.”157 Alabama Power had proactively requested that it be allowed the discretion to
increase the balance above $75 million, and any such increases “will enhance the Company's
ability to deal with the financial effects of future natural disasters (both after the fact as well as
through proactive measures), promote system reliability, and offset costs that retail customers
would otherwise bear.”158 The commission’s 2012 Annual Report stated that the NDR had over
$100 million at that point.159
Louisiana’s approach to cost-recovery mechanisms is similar to that of Mississippi. The
Louisiana Commission did make an interesting regulatory move in 2013 when it established a
new docket in order to analyze whether it should implement methods for adjusting the
calculation for the authorized rates of return for electric utilities according to each utility's
respective compliance with standards for reliability of service and disaster preparedness and
response.160 However, this debate is ongoing and no new rate adjustment methods have resulted
from this docket as of yet.
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C. Utility Response
This Survey also reveals interesting differences in utility action taken in response to each state’s
actions (or lack thereof) regarding storm resiliency and storm hardening. This Section
summarizes those actions using a state-by-state analysis approach.
Florida
Utilities have traditionally responded to the Florida Commission’s actions quite quickly. After
the Florida commission implemented its hardening requirements in 2007, the amount of money
electric utilities in Florida invested on new projects related to these requirements jumped from
$47,949.95 in 2006 to $491,454.50 in 2007.161 The total amount in 2008 went down significantly
to $113,286.68, but it was still over twice the amount invested in 2006 before the storm
hardening requirements were implemented.162
Recent presentations by Florida electric utilities reveal that utilities are still taking action related
to resiliency and hardening efforts five years after the original hardening reports were filed. The
Florida Commission recently conducted its eighth annual hurricane preparedness briefing on
April 3, 2013.163 All Florida utilities gave detailed presentations on both completed and ongoing
projects related to preparing for the 2013 hurricane season. All presentations are available to
access online through the commission’s website.164 The presentations generally reflected detailed
resiliency planning by all major investor-owned utilities, including the use of training drills,
mutual assistance groups, and contracting for additional supplies during a natural disaster.165 The
presentations also included short descriptions of continued hardening efforts, such as expansion
of vegetation management programs and pole inspection programs.166
In addition to participation in the annual Hurricane Preparedness Workshop, all major utilities
recently submitted their 2013 storm hardening reports. The 2013 reports reveal that many
Florida utilities are mainly focusing on the continuation of their existing hardening programs as
opposed to the initiation of new projects.167 The costs section of the report reflects that some
utilities are continuing to invest extensively while others are tapering off their investments.168
For example, Florida Power & Light (“FPL”) has invested nearly $460 million in storm
hardening projects during the period of 2007-2013, but it continues to make significant
investments. On May 2, 2013, FPL announced a three-year plan to further harden its facilities,
including extensive improvements to its power lines and associated equipment. Overall, FPL
plans to invest approximately $500 million between 2013 and 2015. In contrast, Gulf Power’s
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2013-2015 projected costs were a significant reduction from its 2010-2012 costs.169 However,
while Gulf Power has reduced its storm hardening investments, it did propose three smart grid
initiatives for 2013 that are related to hardening and resiliency.170 The Florida Public Service
Commission approved all 2013 plans filed.171
While the importance of the Florida Commission’s leadership in resiliency and hardening efforts
within the Gulf States should not be understated, it is worth discussing the possibility that the
high standards of approval the commission originally required of electric utilities in their original
2007 reports may not be at the same level today. A comparison of the storm hardening plan and
Commission review process of FPL’s 2007, 2010, and 2013 plans shows an example of this
possibility. The Company’s 2007 plan was 227 pages long, its 2010 plan was 171 pages long,
and its 2013 plan was 142 pages long.172 In 2007, the review process was the most extensive (but
note that may very likely be attributable to the fact that this was the first year this type of report
was required). The major event within the commission’s extensive 2007 review was a two-day
workshop/public hearing held in Tallahassee. The transcript for this hearing, which reviewed the
plans for the five Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) in Florida, totaled 626 pages.173 This was
followed by an individualized approval process for each utility. In 2010, the commission review
process for the five IOUs also included a public workshop, involving presentations from a
representative of each utility. The transcript from the one-day workshop totaled 149 pages.174
Each utility’s plan was then individually discussed and recommended by Commission staff and
voted upon by the commissioners.175 In contrast, the docket for the review and approval process
for FPL’s most recent storm hardening plan contains no transcript from any type of review
hearing similar to the 2007 and 2010 public workshops. It merely contains one major review
document consisting of a brief summary of any updates IOUs made to their plans and the
commission staff’s recommendation for approval of the plans for all five utilities.176 There could
be several reasons for this change, but the difference is worth noting.
Utilities have proven to be very receptive to Florida’s creative approach to cost recovery related
to undergrounding. Shortly after the Contribution-in-Aid-of-Construction (CIAC) revisions were
implemented, two major electric utilities (FPL and Gulf Power Company, a subsidiary of
Southern Company) filed updated rates for the construction of facilities underground,
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implementing updated cost-differentiation calculations as authorized by the commission’s
revision .177 Shortly after the revision, the Florida Commission also reported that it had approved
updated tariffs for two electric utilities, including FPL, which allowed customers to pay the
CIAC over an extended period of time rather than an immediate, upfront payment.178
Texas
In Texas, electric utilities have proven less receptive to the reporting requirements adopted by
the commission. Large electric utilities like Entergy Texas, Inc. have not responded with as
much detail to the commission’s new reporting requirements as they have in Florida reports. For
example, Entergy Texas Inc.’s 2012 report is a five-page document with many sections simply
stating that no implementation of that particular initiative is required and requesting the reader to
refer to its §25.94 storm preparation report for other updates.179 However, the report did indicate
that initiatives regarding pole construction standards and damage outage prediction models were
implemented and completed by Entergy in 2011 (though no details are given about those
completed programs).180 Many of Entergy’s reports on storm preparation and hardening list
respectable goals and actions on the utility’s part, but only vague information is provided.181 The
phrase “it has a plan in place” is used numerous times. Also, while some numbers are included in
the reports, many sections do not offer specific numbers, costs, or any sort of specified timeline.
Also, vegetation management is a big focus of the report while the other sections get much less
discussion. While the 2012 §25.94 reports provide significant details about the utilities’
resiliency measures, data in these reports on storm hardening activities of Texas electric utilities
leave something to be desired, especially considering the next cycle of reports will not be filed
until 2016.182
Texas utilities have been very responsive to all cost-recovery mechanisms implemented by the
state legislature and the commission, especially securitized funding. In 2009, the commission
approved several requests, including one by Entergy, to securitize hundreds of millions of dollars
in Hurricane Ike restoration costs.183
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi
In contrast to Florida and Texas, it is less clear what specific actions utilities are taking in the
states that do not require detailed reporting on this subject, but the little information found on
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this subject in these states does suggest that utilities are implementing some proactive programs
to harden their systems, despite a lack of regulatory requirements. However, actions taken by
utilities vary widely.
Research on utility response in Alabama resulted in very little information on this topic.
Alabama Power offers little information on its resiliency and hardening actions. Reports on
Alabama Power’s Storm Center website indicate that it has implemented some resiliency
measures, but minimal details are offered.184 As discussed in the previous section, Alabama
Power proactively requested authority from the commission to use its discretion to accrue funds
in excess of $75 million in its Natural Disaster Reserve Fund in order to invest in reliabilityrelated projects. In 2011 and 2012, Alabama Power incurred at least $62.3 million in expenses
related to storm recovery that was charged to the Natural Disaster Reserve Fund according to the
commission’s Annual Reports to the Legislature.185 In 2012, the commission reported that
Alabama Power has over $100 million remaining in its reserve fund.186 A document search in
the AL PSC docket does not reveal significant details about what, if anything, Alabama Power is
doing with the funds in excess of $75 million.
While the Mississippi Commission does not require specific resiliency or hardening measures to
be reported or implemented, Entergy has a “comprehensive plan for disaster” which was
described in detail in its 2006 request for recovery of its storm costs. This plan included
“maintenance of pre-arranged contracts with logistic vendors, line construction and other
contractors; and maintenance of pre-arranged agreements for materials, fuels and equipment. The
plan also defines the priority for repairing electric facilities based on the need to establish
stability to the electric system and to restore service to critical customers such as hospitals,
emergency responders and water systems.”187 Furthermore, in August 2013, Entergy Mississippi
was allowed to adjust its Formula Rate Plan for the first time since 2009 in order to recover costs
associated with “improvements in infrastructure and reliability.”188 This included adding or
upgrading substations and their equipment as well as over 150 miles of transmission lines. In
2013, Entergy Mississippi announced its plan to spend $83 million on further reliability
improvements and $13 million on vegetation management.189
Mississippi Power, the other major electric utility within Mississippi’s jurisdiction, has taken a
different approach than Entergy Mississippi. In its 2006 storm recovery request, in addition to
requesting recovery for its costs related to storm recovery, it went beyond mere storm recovery
and made a request to build a new Storm Center, which would move all of its most critical
operating functions to a location much further away from the coastline.190 The commission
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approved this request, and Mississippi Power has since completed the Storm Center. The Center
is protected by a 200-mph hurricane-rated enclosure.
As authorized by the 2006 Act passed by the Mississippi State Legislature, the commission
issued Orders in response to these two recovery requests, allowing both utilities to obtain
securitized “storm bonds” as a method of recovering their costs that had not already been
recovered through other methods.191
Review of utility response in Louisiana is limited to one utility: Entergy. Entergy is the only
major investor owned utility in Louisiana. The company has proactively taken some very basic
steps regarding resiliency and hardening within the state. For example, while the Louisiana
Commission has not officially adopted the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), Entergy
proactively uses the NESC in evaluating its operations.
Entergy’s response to action taken by the New Orleans City Council provides additional
information for this Survey. Entergy’s report in response to the City Council of New Orleans’
storm investigation and request for details on the utility’s post-Katrina hardening actions also
provides some additional information about the utility’s primary actions related to resiliency and
hardening: the development of more aggressive vegetation management and pole inspection
programs.192 The report generally emphasizes restoration and resiliency over hardening. When it
discusses hardening efforts, it primarily seems to be using the NESC as its guide. The report is
also helpful in its description of Entergy’s reasoning for not implementing various hardening
projects, mainly emphasizing the results of a cost-benefit analysis. The report addressed its views
on the primary barriers to undergrounding and its efforts to harden new substations and identify
and elevate critical substations. One point worth noting is that it is apparent from its report that
Entergy analyzed and relied upon several publicly-available regional resources in its preparation
of the report, such as the Texas Quanta study, Entergy’s own 2007 Hurricane Hardening Report
submitted to the Texas Utility Commission, and reports on action taken by other major utilities in
this area like Florida Power & Light.
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III. Analysis and Recommendations
The results of this Survey demonstrate that state commissions have a powerful influence on the
actions of utilities related to storm resiliency and storm hardening. The Survey has revealed
some common themes that establish that certain commission actions can successfully incentivize
efficient utility action related to storm hardening and resiliency.
First, as seen in Florida and Texas especially, it is clear that legislative action has spurred much
of the regulatory action taken by Commissions regarding hardening and resiliency. While
Commissions have authority to regulate rates, state legislatures should not sit idly by if
Commissions are not taking proper action. Legislative action, while one step removed, has
proven to spur quick commission and subsequent utility action on the matter at hand.
Another takeaway is the significant positive influence that localized vulnerability assessments
can have on regulatory policy decisions. Localized vulnerability assessments guided the
rulemaking process in Florida, and this guidance resulted in a more detailed, efficient approach
to resiliency and hardening as compared to the other states. Commissions need to take action to
ensure that its regulatory decisions are always informed and shaped by local needs. Furthermore,
commissions are better able to organize a comprehensive and unified assessment than other
stakeholders, either through their own funding or through regulations requiring utility action.
Reporting in itself seems to induce positive behavior. This may be because reporting
requirements are serving to hold electric utilities publicly accountable to their statements, and
also providing more data to both the commission and electric utilities on where there may be
weaknesses to address or what programs are successful, etc. The contrast between Louisiana and
New Orleans serves to demonstrate that point. The public hearing following Hurricane Isaac
allowed Entergy the opportunity to publicly provide succinct, clear reasoning for why it has
taken some actions over others. It also provides the Council the opportunity to review those
actions and decide whether that is the best course of action going forward. Entergy New Orleans
filed a report, as required by the City Council of New Orleans’ newly-enacted resolutions,193 in
February of 2013 summarizing its response to Hurricane Isaac as well as general “storm recovery
matters.” However, interestingly, the report also addressed several reasons why Entergy was not
implementing certain programs: Entergy described the various costly barriers that preventing the
company from undergrounding facilities.194 Entergy also discussed its goals to continue its
ongoing efforts to harden new substations and identify and elevate critical substations in a costeffective manner.195 The report provided much more than simply information on the company’s
activities. It provided an effective way to figure out why the company was taking some actions
over others and where the company wanted to go in the future. This is also incredibly useful
information for state commissions and electric utilities alike, underlining the importance of
reporting requirements.
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While reporting requirements are only the first step, it is clear from the results of this Survey that
they are an important part of the process in order to not only ensure accountability but also
ensure that information is available for electric utilities and state commissions to learn from
others in the same region. The absence of reporting requirements seems to be a serious barrier to
efficient information-gathering and comparative analysis for the public as well as commissions
and electric utilities. Storm hardening especially is a somewhat uncertain science. While certain
actions are predicted to save costs, it is important to know how certain actions pay off in the
future. This cannot be efficiently determined without common reporting requirements throughout
the states and easy access to this information.
As seen in the different reporting responses by Texas utilities as compared to Florida utilities,
utilities do not seem to have the proper incentive to ensure reporting is detailed and adequate
without a review and approval process (or in other words, without a synthesis of reporting and
action requirements). Florida’s comparative success in the areas of resiliency and hardening may
also have to do with its review and approval process. The commission takes a much more handson approach than all other states surveyed through its inclusion of an extensive approval process.
Even though the approval process has seemingly become a bit less stringent during the most
recent review, it still requires utilities to meet minimum requirements that they then must report
in detail to the commission. Texas, in contrast, does not have as extensive of an approval
process. The more minimal utility response in Texas shows that when Commissions emphasize
that standards are not required and vigorously upheld, electric utilities may not be properly
incentivized to meet those performance standards.
The commission has a unique ability to bring together several different stakeholders to create a
public discussion on these important issues, as seen in Florida and Texas. Involving all
stakeholders requires that the regulatory process is much more transparent than the regulatory
scheme used in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Many of the state commissions have
neglected to pass very basic, simple reporting requirements for both resiliency measures and
storm hardening. The lack of reporting requirements doesn’t necessarily mean that commissions
are not getting information regarding action within these areas from the utilities in other ways,
such as base rate hearings. However, it has led to a worrisome absence of information easily
accessible by the public and most likely other electric utilities and state commissions within the
region. For example, the closed-door process in Alabama has resulted in a lack of public review
and knowledge of Alabama Power’s activities. This lack of publicly available information raises
some serious questions about the overall regulatory process in that state as well as Alabama
Power’s preparedness for the storms of tomorrow. This closed-door process can be contrasted
against Florida’s much more transparent, collaborative process. Florida’s approach has allowed
utilities to learn from each other and also work together to achieve the most optimal hardening
and resiliency in the most efficient manner. Collaborative processes allow for the pooling of
resources to gather information that is much more difficult for utilities to obtain on their own. It
also avoids the any duplication in order to ensure two utilities are not spending money on the
same research. Finally, it allows for a significant feedback loop in which other utilities, major
research centers, government bodies like the commission, and the public may help to improve
upon existing plans and actions. In short, it allows for input from many different stakeholders.
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In contrast to the comprehensive approach organized through the Florida Commission’s
initiative, allowing utilities to take the lead with resiliency and hardening actions seems to result
in highly fragmented approaches. For example, Entergy Mississippi and Mississippi Power took
extremely different approaches to storm financing in response to state legislation allowing storm
securitization. Mississippi Power went much further in initiating proposals, to which the
commission has proven receptive. However, Entergy has not done so to the same extent, and
because Mississippi’s overall legislative and regulatory scheme requires utilities to take the first
step, there has simply been no action where there could have been if the commission initiated it.
Without more Commission direction, utilities may not be taking the most appropriate level of
action or may not be taking the most cost-effective actions.
While there tends to be a lot of government and public focus on hardening and resiliency
immediately following severe storm events, the relative success of Florida’s approach
emphasizes that resiliency and hardening needs to be a topic of public discussion at all times, not
just after storms, as they require a multi-step process and long-term commitments from many
different stakeholders. Thus, Commissions and utilities need to break the cycle of post-storm
reaction and instead approach resiliency and hardening as a constant, pre and post-storm process,
involving all stakeholders.
Turning to cost-recovery mechanisms, Texas and Florida have also separated storm hardening
procedures and reports from the rest of the utility ratemaking process. This has allowed for what
appears to be a more predictable, transparent process. Florida’s approach also exemplifies the
predictability that comes along with extensive details. Both the public as well as the utilities
know what to expect BEFORE they take action. This predictability encourages more action just
as unpredictability encourages inaction.
The results of this Survey clearly show that cost-recovery mechanisms are an extremely effective
tool to use to induce utility action. For example, Mississippi’s implementation of certain costrecovery mechanisms after the 2005 Hurricane system seemed to positively influence utilities to
invest more in hardening and resiliency as there were fewer damaged poles, transmission lines,
and transformers overall after the 2008 hurricane season. Furthermore, there were fewer power
outages during that season as well.196 Furthermore, as exemplified by Florida’s use of certain
cost-recovery mechanisms to encourage undergrounding, Commissions should extend their use
of cost-recovery mechanisms to include use of such mechanisms to encourage certain pre-storm
hardening actions as well. Mechanisms should not just be used as a post-storm recovery tool as
they can successfully incentivize efficient utility action in storm preparation and hardening as
well.
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IV. Conclusion
While the five states face many of the same climate trend threats in the near future, the results of
this Survey makes it clear that the regulatory commissions of each state are taking vastly
different approaches in response to these threats. Each state commission researched has
repeatedly acknowledged the high costs of storm damage and restoration, but few have taken
proactive steps to ensure that electric utilities within their region are taking proper, cost-effective
steps to prepare their infrastructures for tomorrow’s storms. In fact, most of the state
commissions researched have not even taken the significant first step of identifying and
prioritizing localized vulnerabilities.
Commissions need to start taking a much more proactive approach in the important areas of
storm resiliency and storm hardening. The results of this Survey suggest that a successful
approach to incentivizing utility action is for state commissions to set specific, detailed goals for
utilities in combination with a more aggressive approval process. Commissions also need to
implement a review and approval process along with a predictable cost-recovery mechanism
within these areas to help further incentivize action. Finally, Commissions also need to take
charge to ensure that localized vulnerability assessments are used as a basis for taking action as it
is clear from this state-by-state analysis that different utilities are taking vastly different
approaches in these areas. This lack of uniformity reflects a need for more research as well as
more use of the research that has already been done. With limited funds, it is very concerning
that some utilities may be spending money on initiatives that are not the most cost-effective or
most needed.
Ultimately, state commissions need to create and lead a more synthesized public discussion on
the importance of taking efficient storm resiliency and storm hardening actions today. Recall that
a search of Alabama Commission decisions reveals that it has not mentioned the term “storm
hardening” once in any of its orders. While this does not necessarily mean that discussion
between the commissions and electric utilities is not happening (though it could mean that),
commissions in the majority of the states surveyed do not prioritize public access to the decisionmaking process surrounding the actions it takes or the actions by utilities that it reviews. This
lack of transparency hinders the ability of all stakeholders, including electric utilities’
themselves, to participate in a collaborative and comparative public dialogue on these important
issues. This risks wasteful overlapping efforts as well as inefficient investment choices. It also
may be indicative of a much larger trend of state commissions failing to sufficiently and publicly
address and discuss the possible impacts of future climate change trends generally.
Commissions need to establish speedy and predictable cost-recovery mechanisms for storm
resiliency measures and storm hardening. Separating the costs of storm resiliency measures and
hardening from the general rate base hearing seems to positively influence utility action as
demonstrated by actions taken in Florida and Texas.
In conclusion, this Survey attempts to clarify what commission action is working and what isn’t.
One issue has been made clear: the hardening and resiliency actions taken by electric utilities in
the Gulf States today are not sufficient. This needs to change, and state commissions are the ones
in the best position to incentivize such changes. This Survey shows that if state commissions
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properly incentivize electric utilities through a combination of detailed reporting requirements,
substantive action regulations, cost-recovery mechanisms, and continuous public dialogue,
utilities will quickly and efficiently respond with much-needed action. Today’s storms have
already cost the nation billions. With the widespread prediction by several studies that the storms
of tomorrow will be even worse than those of today, action is desperately needed.
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